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Federal Assistance and The Changing Focu s of State Planning
State Planners Assess the 701 Program
and General Revenue Sharing
ROGER N. PAJARI
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State planning in the United States is historically associated with the
programs and financial assistance of the federal government. It was first
initiated under the impetus of the Public Works Administration in the 1930's,
which made funds available to states for the establishment and staffing of state
planning boards . 1 All states had such boards by 1939. The dissolution of the
PWA and the drying up of federa l funds during World War II , howev er,
reversed the sit u ation. State planning boards became inactive , were
abolished, or were merg ed into other governmenta l units. By the end of
World War II , state planning as a separate ly identifiable activity had almost
entire ly disappeared. Loss of federal government financial assistance was
again one of the major factors triggering this demise. 2 The few boards remaining attempted to plan the transition from war to peace and to promote
economic development. 3
The Federal Housing Act of 1954 revived planning at the state leve l. It
provided that funds for housing in nonmetropolitan communities be channeled through the states, and required the states to plan in order to qualify. 4
Typically the states asked their economic development agencies to do the
planning and to administer federal funds obtained. 5 In 1959 Congress
amended Section 701 of th e Housing Act of 1954 by authorizing financial
1 Robert N. Cornett, "State Planning, " The Book of the States, XVIII (Lexington , Kentucky: The Council of State Governments, 1970-71), p . 438; and The Council of State Governments, State Planning and Federal Grants (Chicago : Public Administration Serv ice, 1969), pp. 14
and 15.
2
The Council of State Governm e nts , pp. 14-15 and The Council of State Governments,
Planning Services for State Government (Chicago : Council of State Governments, 1956), p. 24.
3
The Council of State Governmen ts, State Planning and Federal Grants , p . 17.
4 Housing Act of 1954, 68 Stat . 640 (1954) and Thad L. Beyle and Deil S. Wright , ..The
Governor, Planning, and Governmental Activity ," in The American Governor in Behavioral
Perspective , eds. Thad Beyle and Oliver J. Williams (New York: Harper and Row Publishers,
1972), p. 194.
5 Cornett, p. 439.
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support for state comprehensive planning. 6 Federal assistance under section
701 has come to be known as the 701 program. Although a few state planning
programs were operated without federal financial support in the mid 1960's,
most of them were related to national policies established under the 701
program. 7 Federal influence in shaping state planning was even greater a
decade after the amendment of section 701. By then it was common for the
national government to require states to submit plans with applications for
many kinds of categorical grants-in-aid , and to act as coordinators of state
functional planning. 8 The national government's influence on state planning
also increased because of the adoption of approximately 38 additional planning
assistance programs to finance state functional planning . 9 However, the 701
program has remain 'ed the sole source of federal aid for state comprehensive
planning .
In sum , state planning has gone through distinct states: (1) planning public
works, (2) planning economic development programs, (3) administering urban
planning programs and funds, and most recently (4) comprehensive, functional , coordinative planning. In all but one of these stages the effect offederal
requirements , standards, and assistance has been to push state governments
into planning. 10 By 1971 all fifty states once again had planning agencies. 11
The future of state planning programs would therefore appear to be closely
linked with federal requirements, standards , and financial aid. Changes in
federal aid would be particularly important to the states that are more extensively utilizing such aids, whereas those states which have institutionalized
their planning operations and finances largely around state needs and funds
would be less affected.
To increase the financial, management and planning capacities, as well as
th e independence and effectiveness of state government, the Nixon and Ford
administrations have proposed alterations or extensions of two federal assistance programs. The first is the 701 program and the second is the general
revenue sharing program. 12 The Nixon administration secured a $25 million
reduction in 701 program funds in 1974 and a further reduction of$25 million
6

Housing Act of 1959, Sec. 419, 73 Stat . 678 (1959), 40 U .S.C. 461 (1970).
Walter K. Johnson , "State Planning ," The Book of The States , XVI (Chicago : The Council
of State Governments , 1966-67), p. 428.
8 David K. Hartley , "State Planning," The Book of the States , XVII (Chicago: The Council
of State Governments , 1968), p. 433.
9 U. S. Congress , Senate , Committee on Appropriations , Budget Recisions and Deferrals,
1975 H .R. 3260. 94th Congress , 1st sess., 1975, pp. 78-79.
10 James C. Strouse and Philippe Jones , "Federal Aid: The Forgotten Variable in State
Policy Research, " The Journal of Politics XXXVI (February , 1974): pp . 200-207; Cornett , pp .
439-440 and The Council of State Governments , State Planning and Federal Grants , p. 5.
11 Vincent T. Smith , Jr ., "State Planning ," The Book of The States , X1X (Lexington ,
Kentucky : The Council of State Governments , 1972-73), p. 445.
12 U. S. Department of Treasury , Office of Revenue Sharing , General Revenue Sharing The
First Planned Use Report (Washington , D . C.: Government Printing Office), p. land The State
and Local Assistance Act, 86 Stat . 919 (1972).
7
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was proposed by the Ford administration in 1975. 13 The proposed reduction
was coupled with a far reaching proposal for modifying the administration and
purposes of the 701 program. 14 These measures illustrate the attempts to
move away from categorical grants in aid which typically impose national
government controls on state operations receiving federal funds. While attempting to cut back on the 701 program, the Ford administration has urged
Congress to continue and expand the general revenue sharing program , which
in its opinion returns "decision-making power and authority to state and local
governments." 15 This Act "imposes no planning requirements on states and
localities receiving funds , and no funds are earmarked for planning or for
evaluation. " 16 State planning is directly involved in the outcome of the debate
over the future of the 701 program and revenue sharing.
This paper has four purposes: (1) to summarize arguments of scholars,
politicians and planners for and against the continuation of the 701 program
and general revenue sharing; (2) to examine interstate variations in the attitudes of some senior state planners toward proposed cutbacks in 701 planning assistance and toward the continuation and expansion of revenue sharing
as an alternative form of federal assistance to states; (3) to provide a possible
explanation for interstate variations in these attitudes; (4) and finally to describe the significance of these fmdings for the future development of state
planning. State planners from nine states in the southeastern portion of the
United States were selected for the study. All of these states are members of
the Southern Council of State Planning Agencies. Senior planners in each of
the state planning offices participated in hour long semistructured interviews,
conducted largely in the winter and spring of 1975. In all but three of these
states, two or more planners were interviewed. 17 Four of the sixteen inter13 U. S. , President , "Budget Restraint, The President 's Message to the Congress ," Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents X (Washington , D. C.: Office of the Federal Register,
National Archives and Records Service, November 26, 1974), Gerald R. Ford , 1974, pp . 15001501; and U. S., President, "Federal Taices and Spending , The President's Address to the
Nation," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents XI (Washington , D. C. : Office of the
Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service , October 6, 1975), Gerald R. Ford ,
1975, pp. 1125-1128; and U. S., President , "Supplement to Message on Budget Recisions and
Deferrals," Federal Register 39, No. 235, Part IV, 5 December , 1974, 42519-42669.
14 U. S., Congress, House , Responsioe Government Act , H.R . 10581, 93rd Cong. , lstsess .,
1974 and Hugh Mields , Jr ., "The Federal Comprehensive Planning Grants Program : Prospects
for the Future," State Planning Issues , (Lexington , Kentucky : The Council of State Planning
Agencies and the Council of State Governments , Secretariat , 1974), p. 13.
15
U. S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Revenue Sharing , General Revenue Sharing
the First Planned Use Report , p. 1.
16 U. S., Department of Housing and Urban Development , Revenue Sharing and the
Planning Process: Shifting the Locus of Responsibility for Domestic Problem Solving, by the
Subcommittee on the Planning Process and Urban Development of the Advisory Committee to
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (Washington, D. C.: National Academy of
Sciences National Academy of Engineering, 1974), p. 44 and p. 54.
17 The number of planners interviewed by state are: Alabama, 1, Arkansas, 2, Florida , 2,
Georgia, l, Louisiana , 2, Mississippi, 2, North Carolina , 2, South Carolina, 1, and Tennessee, 3.
Total 16.
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viewed were executive directors of their state planning agency. Th e remaining twelve were selected on the basis of referrals by executive directors. Th e
states from which the respond ents wer e chosen were selected because of their
geographic proximity to the author and because budgetary limitations preclud ed th e inclusion of planners from more distant states.
CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES TOWARD FEDERAL
SUPPORT FOR STATE PLANNING
Much of the contemporary interest in comprehensive state planning can
be attributed to the 701 program. 18 Under the 701 program , the federal
government will pay two-thirds of the cost of state-wide planning. 19 This
financial inducement along with the increasing variety of planning activities
eligible for such funds has resulted in an increasing number of states engaging
in comprehensive planning. By 1965, 29 states had federally aided planning
programs and by 1967 the number had gone up to 44. 20
In his budget message to Congress of November 26, 1974, President Ford
sought to reduce federal expenditures by reducing the level of 701 funding
from $100 million for fiscal year 1975 to $50 million and deferring the remaining amount for use in 1976. 21 In its review of the President's propos ed deferral
of 701 appropriations, the Senate issued a report 22 praising the accomplishments of state planning under the 701 program and listing arguments for the
program's retention. These arguments suggested that the program helps to
coordinate functional state planning , thereby making other federally assisted
state programs more effective; and that it enhances state management capacity by providing "a coordinative management framework. " 23 This is due in
part to the fact that the 701 program has encouraged governors to beco me
more concerned with comprehensive planning and program coordination. 24
Oth er claims for 701 included the arguments that it helped states to establish
and identify their goals25 and to develop "policy and decision-making docuThe Council of State Governm ents, State Planning and Federal Grants , p. 17.
Hartl ey, p. 433.
20 Johnson, p. 429.
21 U. S. , Presiden t, "Budg et Restrain t, Th e President' s Message to The Congress," Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents , p. 1501; and U. S., President , "Su pplemen t to Message
on Budget Recisions and Defer rals," Federal Register 39, p. 42643.
22 U. S., Congress , Senat e, Report on Resolution Disapproving Deferral of Budget Authority , Section 701, Comprehensive Planning Grants Program, Housing Act of 1954, S. Rep t. No.
94-23, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975.
23 U. S., Congress, Senate , Submission of a Resolution Disapproving Proposed Deferral of
Budg et Autho,ity Under the Housing Act of 1954, S. R. 23, 94th Cong ., p. 576 and U. S.,
Congress, Senate, Submission of a Resolution Disapproving Deferral of Budg et Autho,ity Under
the Housing Act of 1954, S. Res. 451, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 14 December 1974, Congressional
Record 119: S21521.
24
Mields , Jr ., p. 14.
25
U. S., Congress, Sena te, Committee on Banking Hou sing and Urban Affairs, 1973
fl ousing and Urban Developm ent Legislation, fl earings before the Subcommittee on Housing and
Urban Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking , Housing, and Urban Affairs. 93rd Cong. , 1st
sess., 1974, pp . 689-690.
18
19
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ments and tools" which make better short term and long term decisionmaking possible. 26 Finally, advocates repeatedly stress the fact that the 701
program is the only federal program which assists recipients in comprehensive
planning. 27
Critics of 701 funding say that "the comprehensive planning program's
future can hardly be described as bright and/or promising. " 28 Despite the 701
program's expansion in scope, time, and money, the critics claim that real
solid accomplishments are hard to pin down. Few if any states have comprehensive planning programs meeting the criteria outlined in section 701.
Most state planning agencies have not succeeded in coordinating functional
and special project plans. The 701 program has not succeeded in "reconciling
the many informal unlabeled planning functions taking place in given problem
areas." Many state executive branches are decentralized with numerous
departments and agencies having their own bureaucracy , vested interests,
approaches, vocabularies, analytic frameworks and preferred solutions to
problems. Coordination of functional planning and effective comprehensive
planning by a single state agency is difficult because of this and also because
many federal categorical grant is aid programs operate along functional
lines. 29 Dispersion of program responsibilities is hence inevitable. Further,
the lack of program coordination at the national level makes coordination at
the state level more urgent , but much more difficult. Probably equally damning to the 701 program is the claim that the plans called for by most federal
grants are not true plans, but rather documents assuring proper state management of federal funds. 30 Such documents often do not follow recognized
long range state goals but are merely incremental deviations from last year's
budget. In sum "very little bona 6de state planning is being generated or
required by federal categorical programs. "31
State planners interviewed for this study confirm the criticism on the 701
program just outlined. None of the states covered has a comprehensive state
plan. Many state planners suggested that comprehensive planning is impossible and that coordination of functional plans by a state planning agency, even
though required by state statute, is difficult, if not impossible, given the legal ,
structural and political make-up of state governments.
Despite state planners' concurrence with the criticism of the 701 program,
they are not at all in agreement or willing to support the Ford administration's
proposals to cut back on 701 funding. State planners interviewed were asked:
26

Ibid.
U. S., Congress , Senate, Submission of a Resolution Disapproving Deferral of Budget
Authority Under the HotLSingAct of 1954, S. Res. 451, 93rd Cong., p. S21521.
28 Mields , pp. 13-14.
2 9 U. S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Reven ue Sharing and The
Planning Process: Shifting the Focus of Responsibility for Domestic Problem Solving , p. 24 and the
Council of State Governments , State Planning and Federal Grants , pp . 17-18.
30 The Council of State Governments, State Planning and Federal Grants , pp. 17-18 and
Terry Sanford , Storm Over the States (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p . 192.
31 The Council of State Governments , State Planning and Federal Grants , p. 25.
27
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"What effect will President Ford 's proposed cut in 701 expenditures have on
state planning in (name of state)?"
Responses to the latter question can be grouped into three categories: (1)
negative (bad) impact , (2) neutral or minor impact and (3) positive (good)
impact. States , grouped by response types are as follows:
TABLE I
State Planners Perception of Impact of Cuts in 701 Planning
Assistance on State Planning

Negative Impact
Louisiana
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina

Neutral or Minor Impact
Florida
Georgia

Positive Impact
Alabama
Tennessee

With the exceptions of respondents in Tennessee and Alabama , all respondents opposed cutting of 701 funds.
Respondents from states perceiving a negative impact of cuts in 701 funds
made statements suggesting that their planning programs have still not
hatched or are still in such early stages of development that their survival
without federal support is doubtful. Implicit also is the recognition that
elected officials have yet to recognize the role of planning in state government
and have not yet learned to utilize planning services. Without such recognition , state funding is doubtful.
Planners in Georgia and Florida perceived cuts in 701 funds as having a
neutral or minor impact on their state's planning activities . These states
apparently have institutionalized their planning programs to such an extent
that they would survive without federal 701 funding . The planners' comments
suggest that the national government was initially very important in the
establishment of their state planning programs. In at least one of these states
strong support from recent governors has furthered the institutionalization
process.
Planners in two of the states perceived cuts in 701 funding as a good thing
which would eventually have a positive effect on their planning programs . To
these planners , federal assistance has made state planning excessively
ori ented to federal policies , as opposed to state needs. While cut backs in 701
funds would hurt the programs initially, the longer term impact would be to
force planners to prove their worth to elected state officials. In addition these
planners strongly suggest that the planning paid for with federal funds is
ineffective and hence a waste of money and time.
With few exceptions , all of the state planners interviewed decried the
paternalism of the national government. They viewed federal planning re-
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quirements as ineffective in that they result in plans which are not true plans ,
but funding documents , and they held that more often than not federal
priorities come to be regarded as more important than state priorities. Less
federal intrusion in state planning and administration is seen as desirable. Yet
imbedded in this mind set is a major conb·adiction: the large majority of these
planners are unwilling to advocate the termination of the 701 program or the
planning requirements attached to federal categorical grants in aid. They favor
federal money without strings , yet they perceive the state as unwilling to fund
or institute planning. Hence the planner ends up favoring strings which would
require and help institutionalize the planning process at the state level.
EXPLAIN! G INTERSTATE VARIATIONS IN PLANNERS'
ATTITUDES TOWARD 701 ASSISTA CE
A possible explanation of interstate variations in planners ' attitudes toward
cuts in 701 spending is that state governments are in various stages of institutionalizing their planning programs. States which institutionalize a planning program are states whose planning programs are more firmly established
in state law, have firmer support from political or governmental sources within
the state , and rely less extensively on fiscal resources outside the state for
carrying out planning.
oninstitutionalized state planning programs are
largely a product of, and a perpetuation of, external mandate , or fiscal inducements , and are likely to disappear when such forces outside the state
disappear .
The process of institutionalization is related to both urbanization and state
reliance on outside fiscal assistance, and provides a means of relating these
factors. Research conclusions by Thad Beyle and Deil S. Wright indicate that
lower urbanization and state reliance on federal funds are related and that
"states that rely most on state funds are richer , more urban , considerably
more metropolitan and twice the size of the other states . " 32 These findings
suggest reasons for variations in planners' attitudes toward cuts in 701 funding. Highly urban states , being more wealthy and more financially self reliant ,
would utilize fewer 701 funds , and hence have planners who perceive the cuts
as having a neutral or marginal impact. Non urban poorer states , being more
dependent on national government funds , would have planners who view cuts
in such funds as having a bad impact on their state.
Institutionalized state planning programs are grounded more firmly in
state law. Institutionalized planning programs would be required in state
constitutions or in state statutes, whereas noninstitutionalized programs are
likely to operate on the basis of executive order or adminisb·ative mandate.
The existence of constitutional or statutory provisions is evidence of state
commitment. This is much less the case where state planning is simply a
product of executive order. State planners operating in states whose planning
32

Beyle and Wright , pp. 201-202.
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programs are a result of executive order would likely view the cutback in 701
funds negatively, whereas state planners who work in states whose planning is
grounded in statutory or constitutional provisions are likely to be more secure
and view 701 cuts neutrally or possibly positively.
Another measure of institutionalization of state planning is extent of
gubernatorial support. States with governors having extensive statutory and
constitutional powers are likely to have more fully institutionalized planning
programs. Planning is a major tool of executive leadership and management.
Strong governors are likely to promote the development of state planning
programs. One would therefore expect planners in states with weak governors
to view 701 cuts more negatively than planners in states with strong governors. Strong governors can compensate for the decline in federal support.
Urbanization, utilization of 701 funds, state statutory bases for planning, and
strong formal powers in the governor are all variables related to institutionalization.
The following suggests that institutionalization is related to variations in
planners' perceptions of cuts in 701 funds. The relationship between the data
on urbanization and utilization of701 funds from Table II is shown in Figure I.
The data in Figure I suggest that the relationship is not linear and that the least
and most urbanized states appear to utilize smaller per capita amounts of 701
funds . The per capita utilization of 701 funds increases as the states' urban
population increases from 44 percent to 50 percent and declines slightly and
levels off between 50 percent and 60 percent. With the exception of one state,
states with pop\llations 60 percent urban or more decrease their per capita use
of 701 funds, especially as they approach a population which is 80 percent
urban. The data suggest that the states which would suffer the largest per
capita loss from a cut in 701 funding would be those whose populations are
changing from rural to urban (48 to 58 percent urban). It is likely that these
states are experiencing an increased need for planning but have legislatures
that are still reluctant to fund the planning programs adequately. Hence their
greater push for utilization of 701 funds. The least urbanized states use 701
funds less , probably because the pressures for more planning have not yet
developed sufficiently. A concomitant of urbanization is increased interdependence among people making the need for rational systematic approaches to decision making more evident. Systematic development of planning, budgeting, and management procedures and skills are likely responses.
The lower per capita utilization of701 funds in the most urbanized states does
conform with the Beyle and Wright findings. Lower per capita utilization of
701 funds may be explained by the fact that these states have governments
which fund planning activities more extensively.
When the groupings of perceived impacts of 701 cuts in Table I are
imposed on Figure I, it is evident that states whose planning is in embryonic
form have low per capita utilization of 701 funds. These are also the least
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urbanized states which Beyle and Wright suggest rely more on federal support. These programs could possibly suffer a death blow from such cuts. The
states "appear to be 'pulled ' into such planning efforts by the availability of
federal planning grants. " 33 Planners in these states believe 701 cuts will have a
negative impact on planning in their states. Of the states whose planners
perceive 701 cuts negatively , Mississippi and South Carolina operate their
state planning programs on the basis of executive orders. 34 All of the other
states included in this study have planning agencies which operate on the basis
of statutes calling for some form of comprehensive planning .35 In sum, low
levels of urbanization , greater reliance on federal assistance, and the lack of
strong legal bases for planning contribute to the negative perception of 701
funding cuts.
States whose planners perceive a cut in 701 funds as having a good impact
are presumably sufficiently urbanized to have experienced the need for
planning, but have not yet received sufficient state financial support for their
programs to make them self-sustaining. Hence their very high utilization of
701 funds. The 701 cut is therefore perceived as a triggering mechanism to
bring state planners and state elected leadership together .
Florida and Georgia have planners who oppose the 701 cuts, but believe
their planning programs would remain fairly intact even if cuts occur . These
are the most urbanized states and presumably most pressed to engage in
planning, and as Beyle and Wright suggest, fund it out of state revenues .
Other research conclusions suggest that these states "are 'pushed' to use their
own funds to a greater extent to achieve the necessary planning effects. " 36
Lower per capita 701 utilization, statutory based planning, as well as strong
gubernatorial support all contribute to the greater institutionalization of planning in the neutral impact states.
Planners in Georgia , Louisiana , and Florida all mentioned the key role of
gubernatorial leadership in securing an established role for planning in state
government. Such support is crucial for institutionalization of state planning.
The planning programs likely to suffer the most from cuts in 701 funding are in
those states which have the weakest governors. In Table III the nine states
analyzed here are arranged according to the relative power of their governors
and the likely impact of701 cuts on planning programs . With the exception of
Florida, all of the states which would experience a negative impact from a cut
in 701 funds (See Figure I) have weak governors. And with the exception of
33

Ibid ., p. 201.
Mississippi, Governor , Executive Order 55, Executive Department , Jackson, State of
Mississippi , August 15, 1973 and South Carohna, Governor , Executive Order , Executive Department , Columbia , State of South Carohna , December 23, 1971.
35 For example see Tennessee , Tennessee Code Annotated , Title 13 (1972); North Carohna,
General Statutes of North Carolina, Article 36, 143-337 (1971); Florida, Florida Statut es, Chapter
23. 011-23. 019; Alabama, Alabama Statutes , Act No. 657 (1969) and Louisians , Louisiana Revised
Statutes , Act. No. 288 (1968).
3 6 Beyle and Wright , p . 201.
34
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Louisiana, the states with strong governors have planners who perceive a cut
in 701 funds as having either a neutral or good impact on their planning
programs. The data seem to indicate that strong executive leadership can
compensate for cut backs in federal assistance to state planning programs, and
can serve as a critical force in bringing about the institutionalization of state
planning around state needs and priorities. As recently as the ear ly 1970's
state planning activities were still relatively isolated from the governor. By
1975 this pattern is the exception. The latter development could conb·ibute to
the further institutionalization of state planning, especially if this results in
sb·onger governors.
TABLE III
Relationship Between Power of State Governor and Impact of 701 Cuts on
State Planning Programs in Nine Southern States

Power of State Governor( a)

Impact of 701 Cuts on
State Planning Program(b)
Good to
Neutral Impact
Bad Impact

Strong

Georgia
Alabama
Tennessee

Louisiana

Weak

Florida

South Carolina
Mississippi
orth Carolina
Arkansas

(a) See Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Combined Index ofThe Formal Powers of Governors ," in
Politics in The American States, eds. Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (Boston: Little Brown and
Company, 1971), p. 232.
(b) See pages 5-6 of this paper for explanation.

GENERAL REVENUE SHARI G AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO STATE PLAN ING
Federal categorical and block grants in aid have been exb·emely important
in shaping the scope and content of state planning programs. In large measure
they have provided the funds for instituting state planning and have made plan
formulation and program coordination more important concerns in state
government. This kind of federal involvement in state government affairs has
prompted much criticism. Typical are claims that such aids result in (1) federal
dominance of state decision making, (2) distortions of state government
budgeting, (3) excessive red tape and huge bureaucracies, (4) waste of money
(since many federal programs conflict with each other and duplicate each
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other), and (5) the subordination of state agencies to the point of becoming
field offices of the federal government. 37 Many of these criticisms are echoed
in the comments of state planners and Ford Administration officials on the 701
program.
The Nixon Administration and the Congress believed that revenue sharing
would strengthen state and local political institutions by giving them financial
relief, decentralizing government decision making , eliminating overlapping
programs , and reducing the power and role of the federal bureaucracy. 38
Revenue sharing was viewed as a substitute for some categorical grant in aid
programs. Under general revenue sharing , state governments can spend
revenue sharing money "in any area of activity in which they may spend the
state's own funds. " 39 Under revenue sharing , the federal government ceases
the effort to settle the states' priorities.
Because state planning is largely required by grant in aid requirements ,
the shift from grants in aid to revenue sharing could be viewed as a threat to
programs which have not yet been institutionalized around state needs. The
Ford administration's proposals to reshape the 701 program to stress management as opposed to planning , and to reduce the level of701 funding by one
half must be seen as parts of a larger program of reshaping state-federal
relationships. From this larger perspective , revenue sharing can be viewed as
a setback for professionals in function-specific state departments and agencies
and a boost for generalists. Deil S. Wright suggests that revenue sharing was
promoted most forcefully by generalists : governors, mayors, county commissioners and city managers . The latter, he suggests, constituted an alliance
against "the accumulated influence of the program professionals ," such as
administrators and planners in fields such as housing , highways, hospitals, and
higher education. 40
State planners are in a peculiar position when discussing state-federal
relationships. On the one hand their jobs are very likely a product of federal
grant in aid requirements , and on the other hand they are directly involved in
the negative experiences commonly associated with satisfying those same
requirements. Changes in financial , administrative, and power relationships
between the state and federal government affect them and state planning
37 Thomas R. Dye , Politics in States and Communities , 2d ed (Englewood Cliffs: Prentic e
Hall , Inc ., 1973), pp . 58-59.
38 Carl W . Stenberg , "Revenu e Sharing and Governmental Reform," The Annals of the
Ameri can Academy of Political and Social Science 419(May , 1975): 61; Murra y L. Weidenbaum ,
"What Will Revenue Sharing Accomplish?" Duns , Jul y, 1973, p. 11; Thomas J. Graves, "JGR and
the Executive Branch: The New Federalism ," The Annals of the America,1 Academy of Political
and Social Science 416 (Novem be r, 1974): 48; and Richard P. Nathan , Allen D . Manvel and
Susannah E. Calkins , Monitoring Revenue Sharing (Washi ngton , D . C.: The Brookings Institution , 1975), p. 263.
39 U. S. Department ofTreasury , Office of Reve nu e Sharing , General Revenue Sharing the
First Planned Use Report, p . 2.
40 Deil S. Wright , "Revenu e Sharing and Structural Features of American Federalism," The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 419 (May, 1975): 111.
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dir ectly. Their perspective on the continuation and possible alteration of th e
general revenue sharing program and its impact on state planning will be
described here.
In 1972 revenue sharing funds given to state governments constituted , on
th e average, two percent of their general expenditures. For six of the nine
states covered in this study, the figure was betwe en two and three perc ent. 41
It is clear , therefor e, that revenue sharing is not yet a huge item in state
budgets. Continuation and expansion of the program could alter this significantly. Th e planners interviewed in this study were asked "Wh ere has (nam e
of stat e) spent its general revenue sharing mon ey?" Responses indicate that
th ese states have spent it mostly on capital improv ements and on nonrecurring activities in fields such as highways , education and mental h ealth. In
some states th e mon ey was put into the general fund and was not funneled into
particular departments. The Actual Use Reports filed with th e Office of
Reve nu e Sharing are not an accurate means of de termining the use of general
revenue sharing funds since such funds can easily be substituted for state
money in many program areas. 42 It is eve n more difficult to determine
whether such funds have be en used in a departm ent for planning purposes.
State plann ers were asked: "In your opinion has th e revenu e sharing
program had any impact on your state's functional and/or comprehensive
planning efforts ? If so, explain ." The responses indicate that six out of the nin e
planning programs have exper ienced little if any impact from th e general
revenue sharing mon ey. Typical statements are as follows:
"In (stat e) plann ers a.re hardly aware of reve nu e sharing." "Reve nu e
sharing has had virtually no impa ct on state planning activities in (stat e)."
In one of th e six states th e respond ent went on to say that "new federalism
has not enco urag ed th e state to deve lop its planning proc esses."
Plann ers in North Carolina, Alabama , and Tenn essee made statements
indicating that general reve nu e sharing has not impacted neutrally on state
planning. Negative influences wer e felt initially in North Carolina and Tennessee:
" In some ways reve nu e sharing initially impact ed negatively in (stat e)
because it was accompanied with drastic cutbacks in other federal
categorical aids."
"Reve nu e sharing has hurt efforts of planners at th e state and local leve l.
For exampl e, th e elimination of'workable program req uirements ' has cut
the props from und er local planning ."
Onl y one plann er among th e sixteen int erv iewe d perceived reve nu e
sharing as ha ving had a positiv e impact :
41

Mathan , Manve l and Calkins , p. 95 and 337.
U. S. Congress , Senate , Committ ee on Governm ent Operations. Replies by Members of
Congress to a Questionnair e on General Revenue Sharing, by The Int ergovernmenta l Relations
Subcomm ittee (Washington , D . C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. v.
42
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"Even though (state) revenue sharing money has not gone specifically for
planning, I believe it has had a positive indirect effect on state planning
functions. This is because revenue sharing has supplemented scarce state
funds, making more of these available for state planning."
Though most state planners deny benefit from general revenue sharing,
and though a few think it has had a negative impact, this does not necessarily
indicate an overall judgment. To get such a judgment, the planners were
asked the following questions: "Would you say most of the professional
planners working for the state of (name state) are in agreement in their
attitudes toward revenue sharing?" "Do they mostly favor or not favor this
form of federal government assistance? Why?"
Planners in five of the nine states said they believed state planners were
fairly unified and supportive, whereas planners in one state said some diversity of sentiment was evident. In the remaining three states the respondents
refused to speculate or estimate the unity of other plrumers' sentiments on this
subject, but they did not hesitate to speak of their own attitudes. All but one
were favorable. Typical of the responses were statements such as these:
" ... general revenue sharing is a good thing. General revenue shru·ing
... does give states much needed latitude in decision making."
The latter respondent went on to say that he firmly believed that revenue
sharing
" ... should not supplant 701 funding. Revenue sharing coupled with 701
funds can help to build or improve state planning. The utilization of
revenue sharing can be potentially improved and enhanced by continued
use of 701 funds."
Other planners said:
"I believe most state planners will favor revenue sharing because, in
theory, it represents a step away from federal paternalism. State planners
do not want state governments to become mere field offices for our
federal government. [They] would favor continuation offederal categorical grants and especially block grants, to supplement revenue shru·ing."
"I do not believe general revenue sharing is a good substitute for federally
funded 701 planning assistance. General revenue shru·ing is never likely
to find its way into state planning programs. Special revenue sharing
programs could possibly overcome this deficiency, however."
"Revenue sharing is an excellent form of federal assistance to state and
local governments because it puts the planning shoes on state and local
governments where the power really is. It will make plruming more
relevant to state needs .... "
" ... revenue sharing can be effective from a planner's perspective only if
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such funds are tied in with and coordinated with a hierarchy of plans
involving regional and state comprehensive plans."
Endorsement of this form of assistance to the states was not unqualified, as the
last response indicates. In five of the nine states, the responclents strongly
suggested that revenue sharing should not be a substitute for 701 funding or
for other federal categorical or block grants. Several respondents suggested
that 701 funding is more important since the inauguration of revenue sharing
because more professional planning and management are essential if states are
to utilize the money most effectively. Implicit in these caveats is the fear that
revenue sharing as the only form of federal assistance would soon lead to the
demise of many state planning programs. Yet such fears are not sufficient to
overcome an obvious distaste for federal supervision and paternalism in
planning and managing programs.
In endorsing general revenue sharing some state planners indicated that
they were not entirely happy with revenue sharing in its present form. In four
states they cited weaknesses in revenue sharing as it is now carried on. The
following statements indicate what some of these weaknesses are:
" ... initially it was accompanied by drastic cutbacks in other categorical
aids."" ... gives money in such inconsequential amounts that problems
can't really be solved." " ... it distributes money without regard to
need."
"The existing law does not prevent states from overconcentrating or
excessively dispersing such funds."
" ew federalism is a myth, since even under it the national government
continues to exercise a great deal of oversight and supervision."
"It has been viewed as a short term program. A source of'funny money'
resulting in states guarding against becoming dependent on it."
" ... states spend revenue sharing money less judiciously than money
they have to raise themselves. This would be remedied if it were made a
permanent program."
Other criticisms of the general revenue sharing program are evident in the
responses state planners made to the following question: "What changes, if
any, do you think should be made in our current general revenue sharing
program which might improve state planning programs?" Planners in seven
state agencies said that it should be expanded and made a permanent federal
program. Three of the respondents suggested the inclusion of planning requirements in federal revenue sharing legislation, while a fourth hinted at the
same thing by saying:
"Revenue sharing would be improved if states were required to submit
more detailed planned expenditure reports to the Office of Revenue
Sharing as a prerequisite for receiving revenue sharing funds."
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Two of the state planners believe the inclusion of planning requirements
would not be politically feasible and that such requirements would merely
increase federal paternalism without improving state planning very much.
Other suggestions for improving the revenue sharing program included
the suggestion that the amount of funding under the program be expanded
and that restrictions be adopted to prevent undue concentration or dispersion
of funds in state programs. No clear grouping of attitudes toward general
revenue sharing is evident. In sum, it appears that state planners support the
continuation and expansion of general revenue sharing, but not as a substitute
for existing federal categorical and block grant in aid programs, particularly
the 701 program.
CO CLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE OF FIND I GS
State planning has not become institutionalized around state government
needs, programs and p1iorities in most southern states. In all but two of the
nine states studied here , the curtailment offederal assistance via categorical or
block grants requiring state planning would have a potentially lethal effect on
state planning programs. This is especially so in those states that are least
urbanized and that have governors whose formal powers are weak. States that
have strong governors and that are in the process of becoming highly urbanized are likely to meet cutbacks in 701 funding with increased state
appropriations for planning. State planners in the most urbanized states view
their major support as coming from executive leadership , not the state legislatures. 43 Continued dependence on federal assistance such as is available
under section 701 may perpetuate a kind of planning which is least relevant for
state needs. The planners interviewed agree with the summary of criticisms of
the 701 program contained in this paper , yet are largely opposed to the
program's termination.
General revenue sharing has tended to strengthen the powers of state
governors by giving them discretionary funds. However, it is likely that this is
less true in states where governors lack strong budgetary powers. Of the states
included in this analysis only Georgia, Tennessee and Alabama have governors with full budget powers. 44 With the exception of Florida , states granting
the weakest budgetary powers to the governor are precisely the states whose
planning programs tend to be least developed. Hence the likelihood of
general revenue sharing becoming a source of support for planning in the
states most devoid of such support appears remote.
A switch in the form of federal assistance from 701 and other categorical
aids to general revenue sharing would be most harmful to state planning
programs which have yet to be institutionalized around state programs,
priorities, and funding. Unfortunately this includes almost all of the state
planning programs studied here .
43
44

Intervi ews with state planners in Georgia and Florida , Spring , 1975.
Dye, p. 178.

